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GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PAYMENTS AND
ASSISTANCE: A CHALLENGE FOR THE
DESIGN OF BROAD-BASED TAXES
Charlotte Crane*
ANY conventional analyses of the income tax focus on the tax-
payer and his ability to pay. The concern in such analyses is
whether the income tax, as currently defined, accurately in-
cludes the values available to the taxpayer for consumption. This focus
on the ultimate consumption of the individual taxpayer, in assessing the
adequacy of the tax-base definition, is largely the natural result of the
focus on the progressive possibilities of the income tax.' Any effort to
make the income tax progressive merely through rates to be applied to
income seems superfluous if there are systematic omissions from the tax
base undercutting such efforts. Only if all consumption values available to
a taxpayer are included in the tax base can the overall progressivity of the
tax be assured.
As long as this focus on progressivity is a primary concern in efforts to
explicate the income tax base, there seems to be relatively little reason
for concern about the omission of various types of values that are only
incompletely distributed and consumed through markets. Such values,
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Progressivity has itself been justified in terms of utilitarian approaches to the mar-
ginal utility of income, in terms of presumptions about the relative levels of discretionary
spending, and on more direct redistributive grounds. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1399-
1411 (2002) (reviewing PAUL W. MCCRACKEN, DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (2000)). Although the justification for progressivity
may affect one's views on the significance of various deviations from a completely compre-
hensive tax, as long as one accepts progressivity in rates through any substantial range of
income classes, the need to be comprehensive is obvious. Progressivity is coherent only if
the tax base is either broadly defined, or if it allows only those specific exclusions conso-
nant with the chosen justification for progressivity.
The need for a comprehensively defined tax base is also derived from efforts to avoid
distortion in the economy by favoring, through incomplete inclusion, certain economic ac-
tivities and the income streams they generate.
Numerous works establish the notion of a comprehensive tax base. See generally BORIS
I. BIT-TKER ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968); STUDIES OF Gov-
ERNMENT FINANCE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Jo-
seph A. Pechman ed., 1977); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Charles Galvin, History of the Substan-
tive Tax Reform Project, in STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX REFORM 3 (A. Willis ed., 1969);
R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1967); Joseph A.
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1967).
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including imputed income from personal services, the value of govern-
ment services received, and even transfer payments of cash, seem rela-
tively unimportant in determining either the relative overall well-being of
taxpayers or the relative ability of taxpayers to pay. Such items are either
likely to be received by virtually all taxpayers or by only taxpayers whose
ability to pay, even if these values were included in their tax base, would
still be minimal. The failure to include such values when they are only
available for consumption by taxpayers who are less well off (even if the
standards by which they are deemed less well off are not the same as
those used in the income tax) seems a trivial matter.2 It is easy to see,
therefore, why such values have frequently been excluded from the in-
come tax base, as they frequently have been under the IRS' "general wel-
fare doctrine."'3 If only those taxpayers otherwise taxed at the lowest
rates receive excluded payments, the exclusions at worst only enhance the
social program through which they are received. If the program generat-
ing the excluded receipts is itself relatively broadly enjoyed among lower
income taxpayers, the exclusions create an ad hoc additional lower
bracket.
Other approaches to defining income may also suggest that excluding
various types of income, even those not enjoyed in relatively equal pro-
portions across income classes, should be of little concern. Exclusions and
other preferences can lead to distortions in taxpayer behavior when tax-
payers rearrange their activities to enjoy more of the preferred receipts.
But if taxpayers are relatively constrained in their ability to rearrange
2. The relationship between progressivity and fairness is not always invoked in the
ways one would expect. For instance, the Joint Committee explanation of the removal of
an exemption for unemployment payments justified the change as one that provided "more
equal tax treatment of individuals with the same economic income." STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986 29 (Comm.
Print 1987).
3. Concern was expressed about the scope of exclusions under the general welfare
doctrine in the earliest calls for a comprehensive tax base. See, e.g., Joseph A. Pechman,
Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 12-14 (1957); Joseph A.
Pechman, What Would a Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Yield?, in 1 TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 251 (1959). This concern was expressed at the time when, according to the
author's estimates, about twenty billion dollars in cash payments, including social security,
unemployment, and veterans benefits, were excluded from a total tax base of about three
hundred billion dollars. Pechman's primary concern in these early works appears to have
been simply the appearance of unfairness in the exclusion of amounts that represented the
equivalent of payments that were in fact taxed. None of these payments are now dealt with
under the amorphous general welfare doctrine: social security payments are partially taxed
under § 86, added to the Code by the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-
21, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80-84; unemployment benefits are taxed under § 85, added to the
Code by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, Title I, § 112(d), 92 Stat. 2763, 2777-
78, and the exclusion of military and veterans benefits are largely governed by § 134, added
to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 116(a), 100 Stat. 2085,
2512-13. Pechman's willingness to tax even means-tested transfer payments made him a
relatively easy target for those who found the quest for a comprehensive tax base futile.
See, e.g., Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, supra
note 1, at 937.
The Carter Commission Report, thought by many to be the high-water mark of prag-
matic thinking about a comprehensive tax base, would have included all government trans-
fer payments. 1 REP. OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAX'N 17 (1966).
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their affairs to enjoy such receipts-as they may be with respect to most
kinds of transfer payments-this concern about distorting behavior and
the resulting misallocation seems of little importance. Only if we are con-
cerned that the exclusions distort the means by which transfer payments
are delivered, as might happen if the exclusion is dependent upon the
means of payment or the payor's identity, should we be concerned about
distortions in the economy.4 Nor should exclusions under the general
welfare doctrine be problematic from the point of view of those who
would want to identify deviations from a fully comprehensive tax base as
"tax expenditures" because of concerns about the legitimacy of the politi-
cal processes by which such benefits can be bestowed. Receipts excluded
under the general welfare doctrine are, almost by definition, already
under the jurisdiction of policy makers and administrators outside of the
tax system. While actual expenditures in their programs may be under-
stated to the extent that recipients receive not only a transfer payment,
but also the tax value avoided as a result of the exclusion, failing to iden-
tify those additional expenditures in most instances would seem to in-
volve very different concerns.5
The exclusion of such amounts does not, however, sit easily with sev-
eral other aspects of the income tax.6 Many of the resulting problems
4. The resulting distortion may be of concern. The question is whether it is inappro-
priate to privilege government delivery over private delivery of social services, if only the
latter are to granted special treatment. But identifying which delivery system actually re-
ceives preferred treatment is a more complicated matter than simply identifying the one in
which receipts are likely to be excluded, since, as this article will explore below, the tax
treatment of activity associated with the receipt may be at least as important as the receipt
itself.
It is clear that administrative practice under the general welfare doctrine has an effect on
the terms and methods by which transfer payments are made. See, e.g., LynDee Wells,
2006 Legal Symposium, National Indian Housing Council: Tax Treatment of Benefits to
Tribal Members-General Welfare Programs (2006).
5. This decision makes the classification of the general welfare doctrine as a tax ex-
penditure problematic:
The normal baseline, generally used by the Joint Committee on Taxation,
would treat the exemption of all transfer payments from the government to
private individuals as a tax expenditure in part because these "gifts" are man-
dated, open-ended government spending programs and not voluntary trans-
fers from the government to individuals.
However, under the reference tax rules used by the executive branch, gross
income does not include gifts, which are defined as receipts or money of
property without compensation. Thus, under the reference baseline, most
government transfer payments, which can be viewed as gifts from the govern-
ment, are not considered tax expenditures. However, the reference baseline
would consider the exemption of social security benefits a tax expenditure, as
this transfer payment is associated with past employment .... Neither the
reference baseline nor the normal baseline would consider the exclusion of
gifts between individuals to be a tax expenditure.
Emil Sunley, Tax Expenditures in the United States: Experience and Practice, in TAX Ex-
PENDITURE TREATMENT OF TRANSFER PAYMENTS, FROM TAX EXPENDITURES-SHEDDING
LIGHT ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM 155, 162 (Hana Polackova
Brixi et al. eds., 2003).
6. Such exclusions become more problematic for lower-income taxpayers when tradi-
tional income tax measures are used to determine eligibility for social welfare programs,
including the earned income credit. In such situations, the failure to include the value of
2006]
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stem from the fact that these exclusions have only recently been made a
part of the Code. Even then, the exclusions have only been partly
incorporated. 7
For decades, the'Internal Revenue Service and its predecessor simply
ruled that, as an administrative matter, certain transfers, including Social
Security and unemployment payments, were not considered income. 8
These ruling positions were relatively unproblematic when the majority
of the situations in which payments were made depended upon an evalua-
tion of the recipient's relative need and were intended primarily to meet
the transferee's immediate consumption needs.9
Recent changes in attitudes toward, and approaches to, social welfare
programs have put considerable strain on the doctrines under which
transfer payments might be excluded. Payments under newer programs
are more likely to be available before need is acute and to be aimed at
establishing self-sufficiency instead of providing after-the-fact relief. In-
deed, more programs are likely to be designed in ways that provide pay-
ments not directly to the intended beneficiaries of programs, but instead
government services-even public transportation-is far more likely to effect conclusions
about the relative neediness of different groups of low income taxpayers. Furthermore,
there may well be tension created in the applications of the doctrines justifying exclusion
when exclusion can result in limitations on the availability of the earned income credit.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271. There, Temporary Aid to Need Families
("TANF") payments were excluded under the general welfare doctrine. Apparently they
were already not income for Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") purposes under I.R.C.
§ 32(c)(2)(B)(v) (West 2006) (as added by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 1085(c), 111 Stat. 788, 956).
The literature contains surprisingly few systematic treatments of this aspect of the issues
addressed here. Notable exceptions include Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Credit and
the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 572 (1995); and
William Klein, The Definition of "Income" Under a Negative Income Tax, 3 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 449 (1974).
7. See I.R.C. § 139 (2004), added by the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 111, 115 Stat. 2427, 2432 (2002).
8. I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C°B. 114; I.T. 3229, 1938-2 C.B. 136; I.T. .3230, 1938-2 C.B. 136;
I.T. 3447, 1941-1 C.B. 191; and Rev. Rul. 55-652, 1955-2 CB 21. This body of authority was
confirmed in Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 13 (dealing with miscellaneous portions of
I.R.C. § 202(a) of Title II). Section 86, introduced by the Social Security Amendments of
1983, now provides a formula for including a portion of Social Security payments in in-
come. A listing of many such non-statutory rulings is included as an appendix to the con-
currence of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 317-27 (1960), with
the apparent assumption that such rulings should be viewed as binding precedent with the
force of law.
9. As a political phenomenon, the evolution of the general welfare doctrine may at
first seem a bit anomalous: its benefits were bestowed on a broad range of citizens, who
were not likely able to mobilize to obtain it. The benefits, furthermore, have been taken
away in relatively salient Congressional actions. Perhaps this evolution is best explained
by the fact that its benefits were originally bestowed by an agency that was taking the
position least likely to provoke any reaction at all. As of 2004, the doctrine and its related
codifications had become politically salient only twice. Perhaps the most notable was the
decision to tax a portion of Social Security under I.R.C. § 86. On one occasion, its benefits
were denied to non-union strikers (who nevertheless were held entitled to gift treatment
by the courts). See Kaiser, discussed infra note 19. On another occasion, the IRS appeared
to encroach on the extent of the benefits available to veterans and clergy under related
codifications, and those affected by auxiliary rules regarding receipts, discussed infra notes
37-48 and accompanying text.
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to business taxpayers as an inducement to ameliorate a situation that
might otherwise produce acute needs among individuals in the future.
Such programs do not easily fit within the traditional approaches to de-
termining the excludability of transfer payments. And because newer
types of transfer payments are less likely to be limited to amounts in-
tended for immediate consumption, they fit even less well with the doc-
trines used to ascertain the ancillary tax consequences of expenditures
that might arguably be associated with such payments. Nascent changes
in approaches to interpretation of the Code are likely to exacerbate these
problems, since the ad hoc administrative approach historically invoked
to exclude many types of government transfer payments does not easily
fit with even a moderately literalist approach to interpreting the Code.
The problems encountered in accommodating such programs within
the income tax have generally been neglected, both in the tax literature
and in the literature exploring the shape that government relief and wel-
fare programs might take. 10 The provisions of new I.R.C. § 139 as ini-
tially enacted in 2001, and as amended in 2005, illustrate the problems
inherent in establishing the appropriate approach to exclusions for trans-
fer payments. This article will, in Part I, review the history of the relevant
doctrines on which exclusions have historically been based; in Part II,
consider the newer circumstances in which such doctrines and related
codifications are to be applied; and in Part III, offer some recommenda-
tions for the future.
The paper ultimately concludes that the appropriate solutions depend
in large part upon setting priorities among the various possible criteria
that might be used in defining the contours of the income tax base. If
maintaining a maximally comprehensive tax base in order to further
progressivity is of ultimate importance, then the traditional approach
both to the grounds for exclusion, and to the ancillary consequences of
exclusion, should remain in place. But if other priorities are acknowl-
edged, including either a notion of income commensurate with total value
added to the economy, or the notion that Congress actually intended to
provide tax benefits more substantial than simple timing in granting cer-
tain exclusions, many aspects of the current approach should be
rethought. Similar choices among priorities would have to be made were
10. For instance, in the more-than-600-page symposium on disaster relief in response
to September 11 published by the DePaul Law Review, only one author, Janet Cooper
Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627
(2003), mentioned the tax relief measures enacted by Congress or adopted by the IRS.
Only one other law review author has included discussion of the tax provisions in an analy-
sis of disaster relief generally. See John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of
Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027 (2003). And only one has focused on the tax aspects of
disaster relief. See Francine Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal Revenue
Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953 (2005). Even after the 2001 enactment of § 139, the topic
seems not to have been particularly salient in the world of legal academic tax, as the provi-
sion was not always included in abridgements of the Code aimed at use in law schools. See,




the income tax altered to even more closely approximate a consumption
tax, or if it were entirely replaced by a consumption tax.
PART I: THE COMMON-LAW-LIKE ORIGINS OF THE
EXCLUSION FOR TRANSFER PAYMENTS
A. THE DOCTRINAL GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION
As originally explicated, the exclusion for transfer payments could
have simply been understood as an interpretation of the provisions under
which the transfer payments were authorized: absent an indication to the
contrary, payments to be made by the federal government were not to be
included in income unless specifically included.11 The logic here would
be essentially that Congress authorized payments at certain levels, and
that the prescription of these levels essentially preempts the operation of
any other federal statute that might be seen as reducing these levels.
Under this rationale, similar payments authorized by other governments
need not be exempt. 12 But the administratively generated doctrine was
rather casually extended well beyond this, to payments authorized, ad-
ministered, and funded only under state law, when such payments were
made out of "general welfare funds. '13
11. E.g., Rev. Rul. 54-190, 1954-1 C.B. 46 (receipt of federal payments by unemployed
federal employees); Rev. Rul. 68-38, 1968-1 C.B. 446 (area redevelopment payments under
Title II-A of Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (Area
Redevelopment) and under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23); Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19 (payments made to individuals
undergoing training or retraining under either the Area Redevelopment Act or the Man-
power Development and Training Act of 1962); Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31 (receipt
of Medicare); Rev. Rul. 71-425, 1971-2 C.B. 76 (modifying Rev. Rul. 67-144, 1967-1 C.B.
12, which allowed receipt of payments for work assignments under Title V of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, noting that payments were based primarily on need, not on work
performed); Rev. Rul. 73-87, 1973-1 C.B. 39 (allowing receipt of experimental welfare pay-
ments funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity); Rev. Rul. 1976-229, 1976-1 C.B. 19
(payments to those displaced by foreign jobs); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 74-0528-0230A (May
28, 1974) (payments received under 42 U.S.C. § 630 (1971), establishing incentives for
training of families with dependent children, including payments for child care for three
months after participant has left the training).
12. See, for example, the rationale offered in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 55-08-12-5320A
(Aug. 12, 1955) (holding, prior to the decision in United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299
(1960), that strike benefits were includible in taxable income) and in I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,470 (Oct. 31, 1975) (exploring the various possible rationales for Rev. Rul. 74-205
1974-1 C.B. 20). See also Rev. Rul. 57-1, 1957-1 C.B. 15. This approach may explain, for
instance, the reluctance to treat foreign payments in the nature of social security on the
same basis as domestic social security payments. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 62-179, 1962-2 C.B. 20
(Old Age Security Act of Canada to Canadian citizens residing in the United States); Rev.
Rul. 66-34, 1966-1 C.B. 22 (similar payments to German residents taxable); Rev. Rul. 76-
121, 1976-1 C.B. 24 (similar payments from the United Kingdom taxable). The published
rulings contain no rationale distinguishing foreign and domestic old age pensions.
13. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-153, 1974-1 C.B. 20 (assistance to adoptive parents, on show-
ing of need); Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18 (payments, based on need, from state crime
victims compensation board, not taxable). The departure from justifications that could be
seen as simply statutory construction arguments appears to have been first noted in I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,470 (Oct. 31, 1975):
[IIt is clear that the Service has developed a general welfare exclusion that
goes beyond the mere act of Congress in exempting specific federal disburse-
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This "general welfare doctrine" eventually came to be limited in four
important respects. First, it was limited to those programs that were based
on the recipient's need. 14 Although not all early rulings stated the re-
quirement explicitly, those that did not could be explained as having ac-
cepted a presumption regarding need, based on the other criteria for
qualification. For instance, payments made only to the blind or to the
unemployed could easily be assumed to be at least roughly based on
need. 15 Second, the doctrine was unavailable for those programs that in-
volved payments that depended in any significant way on the recipient's
ments and which can therefore be invoked with respect to payments under
state law, such as those in issue here. In other words, the Service recognizes a
nonstatutory exemption for general welfare payments that can be applied to
governmental expenditures that are either federal or nonfederal in origin.
Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 C.B. 26 (payments to blind excludible under the Public Assistance
Law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2509 (West 1956)) seems
to include the first published reference to "general welfare" as a criterion for exclusion.
Some early positions may have reflected the attraction of avoiding difficult questions
regarding the application of doctrines involving intergovernmental tax immunity. Before
1938, it was not clear that the federal government could impose even nondiscriminatory
income taxes on the compensation paid to state employees. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U.S. 405, 424 (1938) (holding that the federal government could tax the salaries of employ-
ees of the Port of New York Authority). Even after 1938, the extent of the doctrine, as
applied to taxes that arguably could impede the governmental activities of a state, was
unclear. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). And even if the constitutional
authority to impose federal taxes on state governmental activities was clear, the legitimacy
of such impositions remained unclear as a political matter.
Another factor that undoubtedly contributed to the extension of the doctrine to pay-
ments made by state and local governments is the difficulty that might ensue in distinguish-
ing between programs that were in fact federal programs, and programs that were more
appropriately viewed as state programs, using funds provided by the federal government
but without binding federal constraints on their contours. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-
2 C.B. 19 (payments of federal funds made by states to individuals under the Area Rede-
velopment Act or the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 were not included
in their gross income).
14. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-39, 1985-1 C.B. 21 and Rev. Rul. 76-131, 1976-1 C.B. 16
(payments made by the State of Alaska under the Alaska Longevity Bonus Act to long-
term residents distinguished from general welfare payments because they were based on
the recipient's age and residency). This holding was implicitly endorsed in Greisen v.
United States, 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988), although in
this case the court was not asked to consider the general welfare doctrine as such. See also
Rev. Rul. 80-330, 1980-2 C.B. 29 (denying exclusion for payments received by taxpayers
pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and distinguishing Rev. Rul.
76-395, 1976-2 C.B. 16 (excluding home rehabilitation grants received under the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974) (acknowledged as obsolete after the enact-
ment of 16 U.S.C. § 470 by the Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987,
specifically excluding such payments from income) and Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17
(excluding grants received under the Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974)).
15. Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 C.B. 26 (payments to blind excludible under the Public
Assistance Law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, § 2509). The IRS has recently
expanded the scope of the doctrine from situations in which the exclusion is available on a
program wide basis, thus making it applicable to all recipients, to situations in which the
exclusion will be available only to certain groups of recipients within the same program.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-09-033 (Feb. 27, 2004) (allowing an exclusion for those
recipients of tribal education assistance with an income below the national median income
level). This expansion may seem to some to push the development of the doctrine beyond




performance of services. 16 Third, the doctrine was not available to the
extent that payments were made to compensate the recipient for any spe-
cific loss to property. 17 Finally, it was limited to payments made by gov-
ernments and was held not to be available for payments by charities or
individuals. 18
The original motive and justification for such rulings is somewhat ob-
scure. When announcing positions in support of the exclusion of general
welfare payments in the most primitive early statements, the IRS and its
predecessors invoked a number of concepts that have since developed
into discrete doctrines, some but not all of which have been codified. For
instance, early rulings contained a curious mix of return of capital and gift
rationales. 19 These rulings frequently addressed situations in which Code
sections with a relative determinative scope now control, but whose facts
may actually extend beyond the scope of the Code sections as currently
interpreted. In such circumstances, should the Code section be read as
entirely pre-emptive of its predecessor doctrines, or should it be read as
confirmation of the core of the doctrine, with no implication for situa-
tions outside of its scope? Should the answer be different if the codifica-
16. E.g., Bannon v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 59 (1992); Meyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH)
1037 (1994) (Bannon is not applicable where the recipient parent is not performer of ser-
vices); May v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2063 (1993) (following Bannon); I.R.S. Chief
Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-27-003 (July 5, 2002) (denying exclusion for reductions in property
taxes otherwise owed by senior citizens in exchange for community service). The fact that
a payment is loosely tied to prior services has not prevented the doctrine's application to
unemployment benefits. See Rev. Rul. 55-652, 1955-2 C.B. 21.
17. The IRS has allowed the doctrine to be applied when the payments are made as
reimbursement for particular expenditures. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-51-022
(Dec. 17, 2004) (reimbursements to families with a debilitatingly disabled member for vari-
ous extraordinary living costs).
18. This limitation alone was rarely sufficient to render any payments taxable, since
the exclusion for gifts would generally be available. See, e.g., I.R.S. Special Rul., 1952,
1952-5 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 6196 (May 11, 1952). The general welfare doctrine
has, however, been applied in some circumstances in which gift treatment is problematic
and, in recent years, has been treated as available even though the gift exclusion might not
be available. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (damages for alienation of affections or
for defamation are excludible, and suggesting that such a conclusion is constitutionally
compelled by the analysis in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218 (1920)); I.T. 1804, 11-2
C.B. 61 (1923) (damages for breach of promise to marry not excludible from gross in-
come); I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928) (payment made to taxpayer for the death of her
husband on the Lusitania excludible); Rev. Rul. 131, 1953-2 C.B. 112 (combining the gift
and the no-better-off return of capital rationale to exclude tornado-relief payments from a
corporation to its own employees).
The gift rationale for some relief payments, codified in § 102 of the 1954 Code, survived
challenge in United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960) (allowing strike benefits paid to
workers who were not union members to be treated as gifts, although under longstanding
administrative positions similar payments to members were taxable), a decision which has
never been repudiated. Kaiser was argued and decided the same day as the case most
often cited as precedent for a limited reading of the exclusion for gifts, Duberstein v. Com-
missioner, 363 U.S. 279 (1960). However, many payments that might have been considered
under the early articulations of the gift rationale have since been expressly included (see,
for example, the inclusion in I.R.C. § 74 of prizes and award, and the limitations excluding
scholarships in I.R.C. § 117).
The fate of the return of capital rationale is less clear.
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tion seems to have extended the doctrine to some fact pattern previously
considered outside the scope of the doctrine, without including other fact
patterns well-established as within the doctrine's scope? Very little effort
seems to have been made to determine the relationship between such
codifications and their predecessor administrative doctrines.
This administratively-based exclusion under the general welfare and re-
lated doctrines has historically not been available to payments made to
businesses, even when the payments are clearly disaster related.20 This
undoubtedly reflects the importance of the need-based criteria in the
evolution of the doctrine, since the presumption of relative need may be
far less appropriate with respect to aid to businesses than it is with respect
to aid to individuals. It also reflects the fact that most such payments to
businesses historically involved replacement for specific losses. Most of
the older authorities involve payments (or debt relief) that relate specifi-
cally to particular damaged properties. In such cases, it appears to have
been easily concluded that the relief payments received should not be
excluded, but should be treated as payments in the nature of a compensa-
tion for the loss of the property.21
Despite the lack of an exclusion for the amount of the payments, recip-
ients of payments for specific losses do not always fare unfavorably. First,
20. The doctrines discussed in the text may overlap in some situations with the exclu-
sion that applies to non-shareholder contributions to capital, now substantially codified in
§§ 118 and 361(c). For an excellent review of these authorities, and the tension inherent in
the denial by the IRS of similar treatment for contributions to non-stock and pass-through
entities, see Kimberly Blanchard, The Taxability of Capital Subsidies and Other Targeted
Incentives, 85 TAX NoTEs 781 (1999). In general, this doctrine will involve the same exclu-
sion-with-no-subsequent basis result discussed infra note 37 and accompanying text.
There are, however, a few instances in which the IRS has been willing to exercise some
discretion in applying administrative doctrines to exclude non-cash transferable values re-
ceived by businesses. In Rev. Rul. 67-135, 1967-1 C.B. 20, an exclusion was allowed to the
winner of a lottery for below market rental of oil and gas properties, and in Rev. Rul. 92-
16, 1992-1 C.B. 15 (excluding emission allowances granted under Title IV of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399). These two rulings have
been cited by the IRS as authority for the proposition that "the granting of a transferable
right by the government does not cause the realization of income." See for example, I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-23-035 (Dec. 2, 2004), and several dozen other private letter rulings
issued since 1992. Some such situations actually involved circumstances similar to bargain
purchases. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,606 (Feb. 27, 1987) (holding that no in-
come resulted from the granting of airport landing rights). But many of the holdings have
not been so limited.
21. Such payments historically have had the same effect as payments from private in-
surers: the payment (if received or anticipated in the year of the casualty) reduces casualty
loss claimed or results in tax benefit income if deducted then received in a later year. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75 (loan forgiveness under the Disaster Relief Acts of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-79, 83 Stat. 125 and 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894). Amounts
in excess of basis will produce casualty gain. Casualty gain can be avoided by reinvesting
any proceeds and making an election under § 1033. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 1999-
19-020 (May 14, 1999) (grants to those suffering flood damage in city-administered pro-
gram funded under Pub. L. No. 105-18, 111 Stat. 158 (1997)). This same treatment will
apply when the payment takes the form of forgiveness of a disaster loan. See, e.g.,
Shanahan v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 21, 26 (1974) (reducing amount of deduction when debt
relief in same year as casualty loss); Londagin v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 117, 125 (1973) (requir-
ing tax benefit income when forgiveness related to prior casualty loss claimed). In both
cases, the court accepted the IRS loan forgiveness in Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75.
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many qualify to take advantage of provisions under I.R.C. § 1033, to
avoid income on the gain involved in situations construed to involve
forced sales of property. For these taxpayers, receipts for specific losses
do not trigger current income, so long as replacement property is ac-
quired, although at a cost of the denial of basis for the amount received
and reinvested. 22
Still other government transfer payments to businesses do not qualify
for nonrecognition under I.R.C. § 1033 because they are not intended as
reimbursements for specific losses. Many such payments are intended as
subsidies to accomplish goals that would not otherwise be adequately at-
tractive financially from the taxpayer's private point of view, especially
when those goals relate to future economic development or to conserva-
tion improvements. Although the IRS has frequently concluded that
such payments should be fully taxable, 23 it, along with the courts and
Congress, has found grounds for exclusion in certain cases. Some rulings,
for instance, have concluded that the taxpayer simply did not have suffi-
cient dominion over the funds in question to require inclusion in income,
given the limitations imposed on the funds' use.2 4 Such payments could
22. Generally, § 1033 provides nonrecognition only when the taxpayer reinvested spe-
cifically in property "similar or related in service or use" to the destroyed property within
two years, and denies basis for the use of the proceeds. Section 1033(h), added in
§ 13431(a) of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312,
relaxes this standard such that no replacement at all is required with respect to personal
property not separately scheduled under the taxpayer's insurance. Section
1033(h)(1)(A)(i) provides that "no gain shall be recognized by reason of the receipt of any
insurance proceeds [for non-scheduled property]." The statute contains no reference to a
replacement requirement, or to a limitation on basis or deductions for the use of the pro-
ceeds. Although these omissions make this "nonrecognition" provision unusual, in that the
taxpayer is not limited in the use of the proceeds, this result is consistent with the stated
intentions of its legislative sponsor, to "[allow] taxpayers to replace 'normal household
property' with a minimum of record keeping." 139 Cong. Rec. S1593-01 (statement of Sen.
Feinstein, on the introduction of S. 364). All other proceeds related to the personal resi-
dence and its contents may be considered as related to a single property, which consists of
both the residence and its contents, for the purposes of the replacement requirements.
23. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 23 (including in payments and cost-sharing benefits
attributable to the acreage reserve program and the conservation reserve program of the
Soil Bank Act, Title I of the Agricultural Acts of 1956, 7 U.S.C. § 1801 (repealed 1965)).
I.T. 3379, 1940-1 C.B. 16 (1940); I.T. 2993, XV-2 C.B. 75 (1936); I.T. 2767, XIII-1 C.B. 35
(1934). Some rulings simply held that such payments reduce casualty losses that can be
claimed, a result that implies that the amount would be includible in income, and ignoring
the limitations that apply to personal casualty losses and possible mismatches of character,
produces the same result as inclusion in income.
24. Bailey v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1293, 1299-1301 (1987) (holding urban development
grant not includible for lack of control); Rev. Rul. 77-280 ,1977-2 C.B. 14 (allowing exclu-
sion for payments to foster parents where such payments were in the nature of reimburse-
ments for expenditures, but denying deductions therefor; results altered by enactment of
the Periodic Payment Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2606 (1983), (amended
in 1986)). Some of these authorities have focused on the availability of a deduction for the
use of the proceeds, having assumed the excludability of the payment. Wolfers v. Comm'r,
69 T.C. 975 (1978) (no deductions for payments resulting from receipts under Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-646,
84 Stat. 1894 (1971), excluded under section 216 of that act); see also Rev. Rul. 78-388,
1978-44 I.R.B. 6, considered in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,293 (July 1978) (same facts, but
emphasizing the lack of deductibility given reimbursement); Rev. Rul. 79-263, 1979-2 C.B.
82 (allowing exclusion but denying deduction for payments made under the Federal Disas-
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be considered as having been made to the taxpayer as an agent of the
government, or, at worst, as having been made loans for specific purposes
that must be repaid only if not used for those purposes. This approach
was codified with respect to certain types of cost-sharing payments in
I.R.C. § 126.25
The net effect of both of these approaches-the explicit nonrecognition
under I.R.C. § 1033, and the no-receipt approach embodied in I.R.C.
§ 126-is a deferral of income recognition. There is no income at the
time of the receipt, but there is also no basis to reduce income at the time
any return resulting from investment of the receipt is enjoyed. The value
of this treatment depends upon when the foregone basis might have been
available to offset other income.2 6 Suppose a taxpayer faces a 15% tax
rate in the year that the payment is received, ordinarily uses a 4% after-
tax discount rate to evaluate future projects, and plans to sell the prop-
erty enhanced by the expenditure of the payment in three years. The
taxpayer in this situation has qualified for a tax benefit with a present
value of 15, but has in the process given up a tax benefit with a present
value of about 13 (the value of an offset to the amount realized in the
third year, at a 15% tax rate, assuming a 4% discount rate). If the re-
ter Assistance Administration's Emergency Livestock Feed Assistance Program, author-
ized by section 305 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5145 (1976), and
analyzed in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,920 (Apr. 1979)). This approach had not always
been accepted. See Lykes Energy v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1535 (1997) (holding that a
gas company may not exclude amounts collected from customers and devoted to specific
energy-saving programs under a state-sponsored program).
The IRS and the courts have not always been so generous, and not all of the positions
taken over time are reconcilable. Compare G.A. Stafford & Co. v. Pedrick, 171 F.2d 42 (2d
Cir. 1948); Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1943), affig 47 B.T.A.
129 (1942) (cited as still-binding precedent in Berglund v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH)
1274 (1995)), with cases cited supra note 23.
A handful of authorities apply a gift theory even to government payments. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hurst, 2 F.2d 73, 80 (D. Wyo. 1924) (holding that minerals rights acquired
through statutory procedures were in the nature of a gift and not taxable income; Hurst
was decided when there was considerable confusion about the appropriate rules for taxing
income from mineral extraction, especially given the political pressure to avoid taxation of
pre-1913 values). The IRS appears to have totally repudiated the possibility of excluding
government transfer payments as gifts.
25. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 543(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2888-90. The
exclusion is to be available only to the extent that such payments are determined to serve
the designated conservation-related functions, and to not "increas[e] substantially the an-
nual income derived from the property." Id. § (b)(2). The calculation of the amount to be
included in income in situations in which the latter condition is not met with respect to the
entire payment is set out in the regulations, and takes into account only the net increase in
the value of the property in question.
As initially enacted, the provision made clear that no basis would be available and con-
tained a special recapture rule in new I.R.C. § 1255, requiring sale proceeds to be treated
as ordinary income to the extent attributable to excluded amounts.
26. Compare the proposal for the taxation of transactions within certain very-small
scale barter communities, Vada Waters Lindsey, The Burden of Being Poor: Increased Tax
Liability? The Taxation of Self-Help Programs, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 225 (1999) (argu-
ing that certain community barter programs, sometimes called "time dollar" programs,
should not produce taxable income, but conceding that retransfers of such values should be




placement property would have been eligible for cost recovery as three-
year property, the alternative tax benefit from the resulting deductions
would have been even higher, with a present value of 14.4. The slim mar-
gin between the benefit of outright exclusion and the benefit of cost re-
covery could easily be eliminated, if the foregone cost recovery were
available to reduce income at a higher bracket in the later year.
Viewed in this way, the primary taxpayer's advantage from the exclu-
sion with denial of basis in many cases is likely to be avoiding cash-flow
problems, with only a negligible reduction in overall tax liability.27 In-
deed, if the taxpayer is in a higher bracket in the years after the payment
is received, the exclusion at the lower rate in the first year may have less
value than the use of basis at a higher rate in the later years, even after
taking into account the discount for the delay in the use of basis.28
In summary, the general welfare doctrine's scope has been substan-
tially limited since its first articulation. Many types of payments previ-
ously excluded only under administrative practice are no longer excluded
(unemployment under § 85), only partially excluded (Social Security
under § 86), or are excluded under specific Code provisions. But it re-
mains an anomaly, not fitting well with any rigorous theoretical concept
of income and without statutory articulation to provide its scope in the
absence of a conceptual justification.
B. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY INCOMPLETE SPECIFICATION OF THE
GENERAL WELFARE DOCTRINE
Commentators disagree about what to make of those aspects of the
discussion that rely only an administrative practice, unsupported by any
statutory language. Is such practice part of the tax law doctrine, with
some force of precedent or simply an administrative practice, like the
prosecutor's discretion not to arrest and prosecute all those who jaywalk?
The leading introductory casebooks on taxation reflect this confusion.
Some seem to ignore administrative doctrine completely.29 Others treat
27. In many circumstances, this same reduction in overall tax liabilities is appropri-
ately a matter of significant concern in tax base design. But in the situations under consid-
eration here, in which taxpayers are unlikely to be able to plan to take advantage of them,
it seems likely that other considerations, including the benefit to be obtained through the
granting of tax benefits in the particular context, ought to outweigh concern for a perfectly
rational tax base design.
28. Not surprisingly, not long after the enactment of I.R.C. § 126, at least some of its
beneficiaries came to realize that exclusion can produce a net tax detriment. The Technical
Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-222, § 105(a)(7)(a), 94 Stat. 194, 220 (1980), added
§ 126(b), making the exclusion offered by § 126(a) elective. The legislative history indi-
cates that a tax detriment could arise, compared to the prior law wash of income and
immediate deduction in appropriate circumstances, because of the strict recapture rule in
§ 1255. A net detriment from exclusion could also arise as a result of the effect of the
exclusion/no basis on the operation of the investment credit and net operating loss limita-
tions. S. REP. No. 96-498, at 79-80 (1979), 1980-1 C.B. 517, 554-55.
29. For instance, MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 215 (5th ed. 2005) simply mentions, under the head-
ing "September 11 Tax Provisions", that "Congress occasionally chooses to provide special
tax benefits," and proceeds to describe the provisions of I.R.C. § 139, without reference to
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its invocation as a rather quaint historical practice. 30 Only a few treat the
phenomenon as more than an aberration. 31 Only a handful of discussions
of the doctrine appear in law review literature. 32 One recent commenta-
tor simply concluded, without elaboration, that "[t]he doctrine and the
policy behind it seem simple: It doesn't make sense for the government to
tax government-provided assistance payments .... The general welfare
doctrine is an administrative exclusion, the application of which is subject
to IRS discretion." 33
The viability of the doctrine is further complicated by the many in-
stances in which Congress has expressly specified that certain payments,
very similar to those that might be excluded under the doctrine, should be
excluded. Some such provisions find their way into the Code;34 some are
its "common-law" origins. For only a discussion of § 139, not its "common-law" anteced-
ents, see SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, 322-23
(2004).
Similarly, Bittker and Lokken seem not to have mentioned the practices in the original
masterwork, and rather misleadingly, associate it with the exclusion of gifts under I.R.C.
§ 102. BORIS I. BITITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es-
TATES, AND GirTs 110.2.5 (3d ed. 1999).
Some authors confront the problem of administrative exclusions for values that might
seem too insignificant to be worth the technical or practical problems associated with in-
cluding them in income, for instance barter and imputed income, but do not mention the
closely associated problems inherent in dealing with government services and transfer pay-
ments. See, e.g., JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002) (although upfront treatment of imputed income, no mention of
transfer payments); MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY
48-54, 63-68 (2003), includes a discussion of United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960),
and taxation of reparations payments.
30. Klein and Bankman include common law origins of § 104, but do not mention
other administrative exclusions. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION 214 (10th ed. 1994).
31. For instance, PAUL R. MCDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, DANIEL SIMMONS &
ALICE G. ABREU, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 146-53 (5th ed.
2004) includes a full discussion of taxability of business subsidies and administrative gen-
eral welfare doctrines relating to need-based payments. This work acknowledges the diffi-
cult line between in-kind and cash receipts, but, emphasizing the progressivity aspects,
concludes all cash should be taxable even if exclusions continue for non-cash transfer pay-
ments. Even this treatment is greatly abbreviated from the attention given the doctrine in
its predecessor. STANLEY SURREY, WILLIAM WARREN, PAUL MCDANIEL & HUGH AULT,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXES: CASES AND MATERIALS 214-16, 294-98 (1972).
Of the casebooks currently in print, it appears that only JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON
FLEMING & DEBORAH GEIER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POL-
ICY: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2005) includes a discussion that attempts to rational-
ize this body of law.
32. Charlotte Crane, Matching and the Income Tax Base: The Special Case of Tax Ex-
empt Income, 5 AM. J. TAX POL. 191 (1986); Theodore P. Seto & Sande Buhai, Tax and
Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053 (2006)
(noting that the doctrine does not fit well under standard tax theory but might nevertheless
be justified because, if there were an adequate zero-bracket amount, most payments ex-
cluded under the general welfare doctrine would be exempt).
33. Robert W. Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross
Income, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 4, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 191-34.
34. Most interesting, perhaps, is I.R.C. § 134, which provides that no military benefit
provided in the future is to be excludible unless the benefit is expressly mentioned in the
Code:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no benefit shall be treated as a
qualified military benefit unless such benefit [was excluded under prior prac-
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codified outside of the Code;35 still others are never codified at all. There
seems to be virtually no pattern to these practices, and very little to be
learned from them about the Congressional view of the general welfare
doctrine. Nevertheless, both Congress (in legislative history) and the
courts (in dicta) have acknowledged the doctrine without questioning its
role in the overall structure of the tax base.36
tice and is therefore a "qualified military benefit"] or... is excludable from
gross income under this title without regard to any provision of law which is
not contained in this title and which is not contained in a revenue Act.
I.R.C. § 134 (West 2006). To this author's knowledge, more recent Congresses have not
acted in a way that would challenge the effectiveness of this provision. It appears that
Congress has taken the provision seriously, since in 2004 it added § 134(b)(5) to ensure
that travel enjoyed under the Operation Hero Miles program, 10 U.S.C. § 2613, would not
be taxed. See I.R.C. § 134(b)(5).
35. Typical is 42 U.S.C.S. § 8624(f)(1) (West 2006), which prevents payments received
under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981, Title XXVI of the Omnibus
Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, from being in-
cluded in other measures of income:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law unless enacted in express limita-
tion of this paragraph, the amount of any home energy assistance payments
or allowances provided directly to, or indirectly for the benefit of, an eligible
household under this title [42 USCS §§ 8621 et seq.] shall not be considered
income or resources of such household (or any member thereof) for any pur-
pose under any Federal or State law, including any law relating to taxation,
food stamps, public assistance, or welfare programs.
Even when exclusion provisions are codified, further interpretation invoking the general
welfare doctrine may be necessary. For instance, the IRS ruled that forgiveness of arrear-
ages on utility bills, administered in conjunction with a program under which "payments"
specifically covered by § 8624(f) were made, could be excluded, following Rev. Rul. 78-
170, 1978-1 C.B. 24, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-43-016 (July 19, 1991). Without the general
welfare doctrine, the ruling would have been forced to consider whether such forgiveness
technically could be construed either as "payments" (and thus excludible under the stat-
ute) or as "rebates" (and therefore not income under the uncodified general rule that bar-
gain purchases are not income)
36. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 194 (Comm. Print 2003);
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REV-
ENUE ACT OF 1978, at 158 (Comm. Print 1979) (explaining prior taxation of unemployment
benefits). Congress has even made statutory reference to similar administrative practices
in contexts in which one can only conclude that such common-law approaches were en-
dorsed. In enacting I.R.C. § 134 in 1986, Congress expressly provided that any "qualified
military benefit," defined to include any benefit that "was excludable from gross income on
September 9, 1986, under any provision of law, regulation, or administrative practice which
was in effect on such date..." would remain excluded. I.R.C. § 134(b)(1).
On the other hand, the briefing papers of the Congressional Research Service have been
inconsistent in their references to the doctrine. Compare PAMELA J. JACKSON, INCOME
TAX RELIEF IN TIMES OF DISASTER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS 5 (2005) (referring only to the payments covered by § 139, and stating that
"disaster relief payments were originally excluded from income" by the enactment of that
section in 2001), with VEE BURKE, WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND WORKFORCE LAWS, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2006).
In its description of the provisions of I.R.C. § 139, written after passage of its provisions
in both the House and Senate, the Joint Committee included a description of the prior
administrative practice under the general welfare doctrine, and even stated that income
replacement payments would not be excludible under § 139, despite the fact that no lan-
guage in the text need be read to include such a limit and the prior published guidance
under the general welfare doctrine had not made the limitation explicit. STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "VICTIMS OF TER-
RORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001," As PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON DE-
[Vol. 59
Government Transfer Payments and Assistance
C. THE ANCILLARY DOCTRINES
From the theory of exclusion that rests on the idea that the recipient
never had control of any value that should have been included in the tax
base, it seems fairly straightforward to conclude it appropriate to deny
the taxpayer any basis credit or deduction for the way in which the value
is spent after receipt. This result is the pattern generally codified in
I.R.C. §§ 126 and 362(c). The situation is just one instance of the
straightforward idea that a taxpayer cannot claim a deduction for an ex-
penditure he never took into income, because if he were allowed to do so,
we would reduce our assessment of his overall well-being by an amount
that was never included. 37 Under this approach, it may seem appropriate
in some circumstances to deny a taxpayer a deduction that would other-
wise be allowed for an expenditure, when the receipt itself was condi-
tioned on the fact that the expenditure was made, and the receipt itself
was excluded.
The IRS enjoyed considerable success in developing this reasoning in a
series of cases in the mid-1980s involving deductions claimed as business
expenses by pilots who were receiving reimbursements therefor as a vet-
erans' benefit. In developing its litigation strategy, however, it rather
sloppily framed its arguments in two different ways. In addition to the
no-control-reimbursement theory of Bailey, in some situations it relied on
CEMBER 20, 2001, JCX-93-01, at 16, 18 (2001). This point was strengthened, with no
additional authority, in the General Explanation. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH
CONGRESS 195 (Comm. Print 2003).
On court acknowledgment of the general welfare doctrine, compare Goldman v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 1998), affd per curiam, 196 F.3d 1262 (1 1th Cir. 1999)
(payments from insurance to wife, for services in tending to disabled insured taxable) and
Bannon v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 59 (1992) (finding payments made to those providing
services to needy family members had received income), with Meyer v. Commissioner, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 1037 (1994) (citing Bannon, but with the government concession that there
was no income because the payment was not contingent on the performance of services by
the family member). See also Bailey v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1293, 1299-1301 (1987) (finding no
income on other grounds); Graff v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 743, 753 (1980), affd per curiam, 673
F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding income, but allowing deduction).
The Supreme Court seems also to have been untroubled by this administrative practice.
See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court, referring to a New York State low-income housing subsidy, acknowl-
edged the doctrine in dicta in a case in which the ultimate question did not involve the
presence of taxable income under the Code, but instead involved the possibility of profits
under the securities laws: "In a real sense, it no more embodies the attributes of income or
profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps, or other government subsidies." United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975).
It is difficult to decide what to make of the fact that the courts have never ruled in favor
of a taxpayer based solely upon the application of the doctrine. Ordinarily, the courts do
not have an opportunity to affirm IRS positions in favor of particular taxpayers, and the
degree of deference that might be accorded to IRS positions in the event that the IRS
deviated from long-standing practice in favor of taxpayers is unclear.
37. As basic as this proposition is to the income tax, it is not expressly stated in the
Code (see infra note 69, explaining why provisions that generally deny double benefits are
not, at least in this author's view, adequate articulations of this principle.) It is sometimes,
but rarely, encountered in the case law. E.g., Remy v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1976
(1997), cf Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1975).
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the language of I.R.C. § 265, that "[n]o deduction shall be allowed for...
[a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to
one or more classes of income other than interest ... wholly exempt from
[income tax]. 38 In Mannocchio v. Commissioner,39 the Ninth Circuit
adopted the result urged by the government 40 but embraced only the re-
38. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (2006). Although § 265 was renumbered by Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, its general text was not changed in any relevant
way.
The predecessor of § 265 was first enacted in 1934. See generally The Revenue Bill of
1934, H. REP. No. 73-704, at 571 (1934); S. REP. No. 73-558, at 606 (1934).
39. 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g 78 T.C. 989, 997 (1982).
40. Id. at 1404. Fact patterns essentially the same as that in Mannocchio were litigated
in at least forty other reported cases, almost all of which agreed-without much analysis-
with the ultimate outcome urged by the government. Those that balked did so primarily
on the ground that the IRS had in fact changed its position after the facts involved in the
case. See Baker v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd, 748 F. 2d 1465
(1984). Shortly after the Baker decision, the IRS reversed its position with respect to the
retroactive repudiation of Rev. Rul. 62-213, 1962-2 C.B. 59 (1062) in Rev. Rul. 80-173,
1980-2 C.B. 60 (1980). See, e.g., Masat v. Comm'r, 784 F.2d 573, 574-75 (5th Cir. 1986). In
1993, legislation was introduced to extend the time period in which refund claims based on
the reversed position could be filed even with respect to cases already decided by the Tax
Court. H.R. 642, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993). The government appears to have then con-
ceded the issue. Rev. Rul. 80-173, 1994 FSA LEXIS 669. As late as 1999, the political dust
stirred up by the Mannocchio position had not yet settled. See Press Release, Congress-
woman Ellen 0. Tauscher, Tauscher Announces Memorial Day Agenda, Introduces Bill To
Reverse I.R.S. Penalty for Veterans (May 28, 1999), available at http://www.house.gov/
tauscher/press/5-28-99.htm.
Indeed, this fact pattern and others involving veterans benefits, had vexed the IRS for a
number of years. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 31,671 (June 14, 1960), concluded that deduc-
tions related to all such military and veterans benefits be denied. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
31,939 (Mar. 16, 1961), however, revoked I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 31,671 (June 14, 1960),
and resulted in the publication of Rev. Rul. 62-213, 1962-2 C.B. 59, revoked by Rev. Rul.
83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72, which allowed such deductions, I.R.S. Tech. Mem. 77-39-004 (June
24, 1977) held that the taxpayer subject to that ruling could rely on Rev. Rul. 62-213. In
Rev. Rul. 80-173, 1980-2 C.B. 60, the IRS began to change its position and denied educa-
tional expense deduction for amounts related to 38 U.S.C. § 1677 payments on a reim-
bursement theory. Because this particular benefits statute required a closer connection
between the tuition paid and the amount received, Rev. Rul. 62-213 could be satisfactorily
distinguished. Shortly thereafter, the IRS took the next step in I.R.S. General Counsel
Memoranda 38,948 (Dec. 27, 1982), and revoked I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 31,939 (this had
been earlier "revoked" by I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,506 (May 26, 1971), but that memo-
randum seems not to have been followed) and held that no current deductions under
I.R.C. § 162, 163, or 164 were available because of the limitation in I.R.C. § 265(1).
Issues relating to deductions based on amounts for which exemption under I.R.C. § 107
was available were sometimes considered in this same series of rulings. I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 28,843 (Mar. 25, 1958) had originally held that no deductions would be allowed for
mortgage interest or property taxes directly reimbursed by exempt allowances, but was
revoked by I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 31,939 (March 16, 1961). This position was made
public in Rev. Rul. 62-212, 1962-2 C.B. 41. This result, like the result in the context of the
military benefits in the above paragraph, was reversed in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,948
(Aug. 21, 1981).
The systemic change was announced publicly in Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72. The
triumph in Mannocchio and the announcement of Rev. Rul. 83-3 did not, however, bring
an end to these issues. Congress intervened with section 1052 of the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, which directed that Rev. Rul. 83-3 be applied before
January 1, 1986, at least with respect to taxpayers who already owned homes; the IRS
responded in July 1985 with Rev. Rul. 85-96, 1985-2 C.B. 87, which indicated that the Ser-
vice will not disallow such deductions before January 1, 1987. Section 144 of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2121, added I.R.C. § 265(a)(6), and
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imbursement theory, and not the general applicability of § 265, to deny
basis for using excluded receipts in certain circumstances.
The application of § 265 in these cases involving reimbursement for
particular expenditures has considerable intuitive appeal and produces
essentially the same pattern as that provided for under the specific terms
of I.R.C. § 126. It should be noticed, however, that denying the deduc-
tion will usually put the recipient taxpayer in exactly the same position
that he would have been in had no exclusion been provided for the re-
ceipt. Again, if he is a taxpayer in the 15% bracket, and receives and
spends $100 in the same tax year, he will have received a tax benefit of 15
from the exclusion, but will have been denied a benefit of 15 from the
§ 162 expense.41
Is this "no-benefit" result inconsistent with the exclusion for the pay-
ments in the first place? To answer that question, one would need to
know more than we are likely to know about the initial reasons for the
exclusion. Perhaps it was simply to avoid the administrative and public
relations problems inherent in attempting to tax a payment that is sup-
posed to serve as reimbursement for another payment. Adjusting the re-
imbursement to take into account an approximation of the recipient's tax
liability is not an easily explained computation,42 and adjusting it to take
into account the taxpayer's actual tax liability would be an administrative
disaster.43 But if taxes are taken out of the reimbursement without an
adjustment, then there is only incomplete reimbursement.
The IRS has continued to press its victory in Mannocchio, using both
the reimbursement rational and the § 265 rationale. In some instances,
the application of Mannocchio seems unremarkable. 44 And the IRS has
removed the deductibility of home mortgage interest payments and real property taxes
from the application of § 265 when such payments were tied to military housing al-
lowances. This incomplete response leaves open questions about the applicability of § 265
to other uses of such exempt benefits, including basis in homes.
41. For taxpayers whose deduction would only be as an employee business deduction,
available only in computing taxable income (below the line) under § 62, the exclusion may
be more beneficial than the deduction. In recent years, such a deduction would not only
have not reduced adjusted gross income, but would also have been subject to the limita-
tions of § 67 (that is, the 2% floor), § 68 (the "haircut" of itemized deductions for higher
income taxpayers), and the alternative minimum tax.
42. The confusion stems from the fact that the additional reimbursement would be
subject to tax as well, calling for round after round of reimbursement. The solution is that
the "grossed-up" payment should equal the target payment divided by the term (1-7),
where T is the assumed tax rate.
43. Not only would it be very difficult to have the grossing-up occur in the same year
as the underlying payment that entitled the receipt of the payment, but the tax rate to be
used would have to be each individual taxpayer's actual marginal tax rate.
44. E.g., Induni v. Comm'r, 990 F.2d 53, 57 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding that mortgage
interest deductions were not available when taxpayer had enjoyed exclusion of a living
quarters allowance under 5 U.S.C. § 5923(2)). The court viewed the 1986 enactment of
§ 265(a)(6) as "ratif[ying] the more expansive view of Section 265(a)(1)" that the IRS had
espoused in the 1980's. Id. The court appears to have assumed that the interpretation of
§ 265 by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 83-3, where "the taxpayer has incurred expenses for the
purposes for which the tax-exempt income was received" was the standard ratified. Id.
Similarly, in Lapin v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Haw. 1987), the court held that
the portion of state income tax paid on a cost of living adjustment that was exempt from
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shown some restraint in pressing its position; it has ruled that deductions
for otherwise deductible expenditures (including home mortgage interest,
state taxes, and investment interest) are not limited by its § 265 analysis,
simply because all of the taxpayer's salary is exempt. 45 In other situa-
tions, however, it has urged its interpretation in contexts in which it is not
entirely clear that the net no-benefit result is appropriate. 46 In still
others, the taxpayer has ended up in a worse position for ever having
enjoyed the exclusion at all. For instance, in Stroud v. United States,47 the
court upheld the government's position that payments made for breach of
terms of the National Health Services Corps Scholarship Program would
not be deductible, even though these payments were three times greater
than the total of the excluded funds received. While one might find full
deductibility inappropriate (perhaps on a tax benefit theory), complete
denial seems punitive. While a punitive response might be appropriate,
the invocation of § 265 to reach such a conclusion is not. 48 At the same
time, however, the IRS has continued to press the more natural reading
of § 265, to deny a deduction for costs invested in ways expected to pro-
duce an exempt return. Payments to lawyers, application fees, and other
costs of this sort will generally not be deductible when expended in antici-
pation of excludable receipts. As far as this author is aware, the IRS has
federal income tax but not state income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 912(2) could not be de-
ducted. The position in Lapin was consistent with a fairly well-developed body of prior
law, established when many more types of compensation income were likely to be exempt.
E.g., Curtis v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 648 (1944); Heffelfinger v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 985 (1945);
Marsman v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 1 (1952), affd in part and rev'd in part, 205 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.
1953). Despite these government victories with respect to state income taxes owed on
federally-exempt income, there are no cases regarding other types of expenses that might
be "associated with" but not "lead to the production" of exempt income. It is difficult to
surmise whether this void is the result of the taxpayers not claiming deductions for such
expenditures, or whether the government did not challenge them.
The patterns in Rickard v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 188 (1987), (disallowing deductions
and investment tax credits for expenses relating to the use of Indian land, the income from
which was exempt under the doctrine of Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956)) and An-
clote Psychiatric Center v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (1998) (disallowing deduc-
tions when hospital lost its tax exemption, of payments relating to business conducted
when tax exempt) were a bit less clear within the Mannochio framework.
45. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-27-041 (July 6, 2001). The IRS also took a less aggressive
stance in I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-46-003 (Aug. 1, 2002) (allowing a taxpayer
who receives damages in a judgment requiring that punitive damages be paid to the state,
to deduct the entire amount of attorney fees, without allocating a portion to punitive dam-
ages paid directly to the state).
46. It has indicated that it would deny a deduction for the use of amounts received by
businesses affected by September 11 from private charities, but it has not, to this writer's
knowledge, so ruled. Compare Letter from Lewis Fernandez, Deputy Associate Chief
Counsel, Income Tax Accounting to Richard M. Lipton, Chair, Section of Taxation, A.B.A.
(Apr. 15, 2002), ABA Tax Section, http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2005/
050915kat.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006), with rulings discussed below, infra notes 55-56
and accompanying text.
47. 906 F. Supp. 990 (D.S.C. 1995), affd on these issues, 94 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
The taxpayer in Stroud received just under $80,000 in tuition assistance for medical school,
and, within four years after the last assistance was received, owed $400,000 including
interest.
48. The court in Stroud acknowledged, but did not decide based upon, denial of de-
ductibility under § 162(f). Cf Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94 (1995).
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never asserted that both approaches would apply to the same fact pat-
tern, although it would appear to be only a matter of time before such a
circumstance will present itself.
PART II: THE NEW CHALLENGES
Into this body of administrative practice, Congress, in response to the
events of September 11, enacted new § 139 of the Code.49
The section originally provided for the exclusion for various types of
"disaster relief payments" made to individuals. Some, but not all, of the
payments covered by the original terms of § 139 would have likely been
entitled to exclusion under the prior administrative practice. All pay-
ments referred to in the statute are keyed to the occurrence of a particu-
lar disaster, although the disasters covered are of various types and
generally require some sort of official designation as such by a state, lo-
cal, or federal authority. Relief payments made by any payor appear to
be covered as long as they represent payment for "reasonable and neces-
sary personal, family, living or funeral expenses" or for "the repair or
rehabilitation of a personal residence or repair or replacement of its con-
tents."'50 Relief payments made by governmental agencies are excludible
so long as they are made "to promote the general welfare.151
Conspicuously absent from these requirements are the limitations that
historically have applied to payments that are not intended as compensa-
tion for specific losses, that is, the requirement that the payments be
made in accordance with need. While the fact of the disaster might itself
justify a presumption of need in some cases, such a presumption is clearly
not appropriate in all cases. Furthermore, many payments aimed at the
particular individuals' needs, including capital expenditures relating to
housing, need not be made by government entities.
In its earliest rulings after the enactment of I.R.C. § 139, the IRS made
clear that the enactment of the section did not pre-empt the general wel-
fare doctrine, even with respect to payments very similar in nature to
those included within the statute. Little else about the effect of the stat-
ute and its interaction with the general welfare doctrine, and with other
statutory exclusions, was as clear. In Rev. Rul. 2003-12,52 the IRS at-
tempted to sort some of this out; with respect to payments made to reim-
burse flood victims for medical, housing, and transportation expenses
resulting from the flood, it concluded that payments from governments
could not be excluded as gifts, but could be excluded both under § 139
and the general welfare doctrine.53 Payments made by charities, on the
other hand, could be excluded as gifts, and not under the general welfare
49. I.R.C. § 139 (2004).
50. Id. § (b)(1)-(2).
51. Id. § (b)(4).
52. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-3 I.R.B. 283 (stating that § 139 "codifies but does not sup-




doctrine, without considering whether they could be excluded under
§ 139. Finally, payments from employers could be excluded only under
§ 139, and not under either the general welfare doctrine or as gifts. 54 Al-
though the ruling went to some length to specify exactly which doctrines
might apply, depending upon the identity of the payor, the ruling is less
than clear about how the consequences might vary depending upon which
doctrine was applicable. One can only speculate that the IRS was aware
of the possible differences in the ancillary consequences of the exclusion
under the three provisions, but unwilling to announce its conclusions.
The scope of § 139 soon became a matter of considerable political con-
troversy. 55 In recent years, disaster relief and other public assistance pro-
grams have become less concerned with emergency aid to victims and
more targeted toward prevention and investment in economic infrastruc-
ture. Such programs are, for example, designed to provide funds to allow
businesses and homeowners to flood-proof their buildings (for instance,
by elevating foundations) or even to relocate, to mitigate the damage of a
predictable future flood.56 With the shift from disaster relief (and the
presumption of need likely to accompany disaster relief) to disaster miti-
gation (where no such presumption seems appropriate, at least with re-
spect to the particular grantee, who may be a significant economic
presence in a community rather than a victim likely to be rendered desti-
tute by a disaster), the traditional general welfare doctrine is less likely to
apply. But in the popular mind, many such programs are direct substi-
54. Id.
55. There are other issues regarding the scope of § 139 that remain unresolved. Sec-
tion 139(a) provides an exclusion only to "individuals," and, although most of the pay-
ments described in the statute related to the personal needs of the taxpayer, § 139(b)(4)
provides an exclusion for any payment made by government instrumentalities "to promote
the general welfare." Some early interpretations suggested that payments to businesses
could never be seen as promoting "general welfare." See Letter from Charles 0. Rossotti,
Commissioner, to Carolyn Maloney, Representative, New York (Nov. 6, 2002), available at
http://maloney.house.gov/documents/olddocs/Septll/llO6021RSResponse.pdf. This posi-
tion was at first only suggested in the rulings published by the IRS. Thus § 139 could
provide a basis for excluding payments to individuals with respect to the affect of damage
to their businesses, especially if operated as sole proprietorships, but perhaps even with
respect to their ownership interests in entities. The IRS rejected this possibility, however,
in Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B. 120. See also I.R.S. Notice 2003-18, 2003-14 I.R.B. 1.
Subsections 139(a) and (b) clearly provide no basis for exclusion of amounts paid di-
rectly to entities. For corporations, exclusion with the denial of basis is afforded by § 118.
There appears to be no similar authority for entities like partnerships and LLCs to which
§ 118 does not apply. See generally authorities cited supra note 20.
Legislation is still pending that would provide in an uncodified provision an exclusion for
all September 11 payments without regard to the nature of the payment. See, e.g., H.R.
2196, 199th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (introduced by Rep. Maloney and others). Those in
Congress who originally sought to provide grounds for exclusion of all September 11 disas-
ter payments clearly understood that the benefit of an exclusion would be threatened by
the denial of a deduction. See Letter from Carolyn Maloney, Representative, New York,
to Robert Wentzel, Acting Commissioner (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://www-
maloney.house.gov/documents/olddocs/Septll/040703HasterFrist.pdf. The fact that not all
of these original supporters remain suggests that the benefit of the exclusion given the cost
of the denial of basis is not worth the political capital that might be expended in obtaining
the exclusion.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001, 5121(b)(4) (West 2006).
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tutes for victim relief: in effect, providing current benefits to potential
future victims, with the goal of limiting the damages experiences by these
specific victims and minimizing the overall economic impact of future
disasters.
In examining such programs the IRS concluded, consistent with its
prior positions relating both to relief targeted at specific property losses
and to general economic subsidies, that such payments should not be ex-
cludible from the recipient's income under the general welfare doctrine.5 7
Unlike many such payments in the past, such payments made now are
often made directly to the private property owner who then engages in
the work, and not to the local government which then contracts for work
to be done. The receipts are therefore much more likely to be properly
considered to be within the total control of the recipient. These payments,
furthermore, are far more likely to have been made in amounts signifi-
cant enough to trigger a substantial tax liability, and yet not to involve
circumstances in which the upfront tax liability would soon be mitigated
by cost recovery deductions.
The net result of this position was seen, however, as a catch-twenty-two
for recipients: recipients accepting funds needed to spend them as desig-
nated by the program (even if they would not have spent as much of their
own funds and even if the immediate increase in value of their property
did not justify the expenditure), but could incur a tax liability of up to
forty percent of the amount received. Indeed, the resulting tax liability
could be greater than the individual taxpayer's perception of the value of
the funded project. And, given that most such federal programs required
matches from local governments, the ruling in effect required a local gov-
ernment to make a contribution (determined according to the recipient's
tax rate) to the federal government.
The political reaction to this announced position was relatively swift:
extension of § 139 to cover disaster mitigation was included in the Presi-
dent's budget proposals announced in the fall of 2004 and was enacted
with the added flair of a Presidential signature on April 15, 2005.58 The
new legislation added exclusions for "qualified disaster mitigation pay-
ments," defined only to include payments made under specific existing
federal programs. 59 It also contained its own limited denial of double
benefit provision: "no increase in the basis ... of any property shall result
from any amount excluded under this subsection with respect to such
property. '60 This language, it would appear, attempts to provide the
same result available to those receiving cost sharing payments under
§ 126.
This new subsection also specifically denies exclusion to "any amount
57. I.R.C. § 139(b).
58. I.R.C. § 139(g), added by the Proper Tax Treatment of Certain Disaster Mitigation
Payments, Pub. L. No. 109-7 § (1)(a), 119 Stat. 21, 21 (2005).
59. Id. § (g)(2).
60. Id. § (g)(3).
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received for the sale or disposition of any property. '61 There is some
irony to this limitation, since some of the more extreme cases publicized
in the campaign for expanding § 139 involved payments to facilitate relo-
cation, which frequently take the form of local government acquisition of
properties located in hazard-prone areas.62 More likely than not, how-
ever, such taxpayers actually needed little relief. For taxpayers moved
from residences, the provisions of § 121 afford an exclusion for any gain
on the sale to the government;63 for taxpayers moved from businesses,
and to the extent the benefits of § 121 are not available, § 1033 should
operate in the ordinary way.
But the 2005 legislation was not limited to providing this new exclu-
sion. The price paid for the extension of the exclusion to mitigation pay-
ments was the clarification of the extent to which all amounts excluded
under § 139 were subject to a "denial of double benefit" rule.64 New sec-
tion 139(h) provides that "no deduction or credit shall be allowed (to the
person for whose benefit [the payment is made]) for, or by reason of, any
expenditure to the extent of the amount excluded.., with respect to such
expenditure. 65
The drafting of this more extensive denial of double benefits provision
leaves much to be desired. It refers only to "deductions ... for, or by
reason of any expenditure of the amount excluded. '"66 Is this a reference
only to deductions, or is it a limitation on all use of basis? In recent
years, the IRS has unhesitatingly taken the position that similar refer-
ences to "deduction" in statutory language should be interpreted to in-
clude both current deductions and basis. 67 Such an approach would seem
appropriate here, except that the more limited denial-of-double benefit
provision subsection 139(g)(3) relating to disaster mitigation payments
specifically refers only to basis. How should the two be read together-
as if subsection 139(g)(3) refers only to basis in the narrow sense and
subsection 139(h) refers only to deductions in the narrow sense, or as if
the two invoke the same general principle, and therefore subsection
139(g)(3) is redundant? Or are there other ways of reconciling the provi-
sions, so that each can be given some independent meaning-for in-
stance, that § 139(h) refers only to deductions, and not to basis to be used
61. Id. § (g)(2).
62. See Jeff Harington, IRS to Tax Federal Hurricane Grants, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2004, available at www.sptimes.com/2004/10/27/Business/
IRS tax federalhu.shtml; Press Release, United States Senate, Bond Bill to Stop IRS
"Disaster Tax" Passes Senate, Legislation Will Protect Emergency Funds for Flood, Tor-
nado and Hurricane Victims (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://www.bond.senate.gov/
atwork/recordtopic.cfm?id=236374.
63. Section 121 generally allows the exclusion of up to $500,000 in gain to married
taxpayers who have lived in the property sold for at least two years.
64. I.R.C. § 139(h).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a) (1967).
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only in calculating gain on sale? 68
Regardless of how § 139(h) is interpreted, the interaction of § 139 and
§ 265(a) will present further interpretive problems. Section 139(h) is at
least in part duplicative of the interpretation of § 265(a) that would deny
basis for the use of excluded funds. Could the application of § 265(a)
that denies deductibility for expenses intended to produce an excluded
return also be applied to deny a deduction for the costs of obtaining dis-
aster relief and disaster mitigation funds?
PART III: ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES IN TAX-BASE DESIGN
Despite the importance that accurately gauging each taxpayer's income
has played in the historical development of the income tax base, other
criteria have also played important roles. Under the income tax, only
income, or new value, is to be taxed. The income tax base generally in-
cludes a value based on the exchange of that value by a taxpayer in the
market. The value received in the exchange, less the costs incurred in
creating that value, is subject to tax. Each taxpayer is taxed only on her
discrete addition of value, as measured by the value she receives, reduced
by any value she has used up in creating the new value. Thus, under an
income tax, those who create and transfer value prior to the transfer to
the ultimate consumer must pay tax to the extent of the new value actu-
ally created, either by them or by others sharing with them because of a
financial investment. But they are taxed as soon as the value they create
is exchanged, whether or not the receipt is consumed immediately. 69
In sum, the income tax seeks to tax new value in the hands of those
who create it, when it is created, even if that time is long before the time
the value is consumed. (For simplicity, those who share in value creation
because they make their capital available will be referred to as value cre-
ators. This simplification emphasizes that the primary concern is with the
time at which tax is properly imposed under the income tax.) The income
tax, as least as currently implemented, is ambivalent about whether this
creator of value is the actual consumer of the value. On the one hand,
the treatment of gifts suggests that the normative emphasis is on the crea-
tor of the value. Once the value has been taxed upon creation, it can be
68. Other provisions added by Act of Sept. 25, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat.
2016, also contained their own denial of double benefit provisions: § 304, providing an
exclusion for mileage reimbursements for the use of automobiles for charity volunteers,
provides that no "deduction or credit shall be allowed under any other provision of such
Code with respect to the expenses excludable." Id. § 304, 119 Stat. at 2024-25. Section 401
provides that no income should be recognized on the discharge of nonbusiness bad debt of
individuals in certain hurricane affected areas, but in a somewhat cryptic provision, in-
cludes a subsection (d) entitled "Denial of double benefits" that merely states that "the
amount excluded from gross income ... shall be treated in the same manner as an amount
excluded under section 108(a)." Id. § 401, 119 Stat. at 2026.
69. If the receipt is reinvested, either directly in a project in which the taxpayer creates
value or through financing of a project of another taxpayer, the later receipts, less costs,
will also be included in the tax base. Most discussions of the tax base choice focus on these
financial receipts, because they are taxed only in the income tax base, not in many of the
other competing tax bases.
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transferred to others for consumption without reduction in the donor/
creator's tax base or increase in the donee/consumer's tax base.70 On the
other hand, many exceptions appear to allow reduction in the tax base
when the creator clearly will not consume values previously taxed. The
deduction for state and local taxes, the charitable deduction, and the de-
duction for casualty losses all can be seen as exceptions to the general
rule that it is value creation, not value consumption, that determines in-
come tax liability.
This view of the income tax may not be as familiar to some readers as
the traditional emphasis on the consumption values available to each tax-
payer asserted at the outset of this article. Some insist that difficult ques-
tions under the income tax should be analyzed in terms of the change in
wealth of the recipient, without regard to the source of that change in
wealth. Indeed, that appears to be the holding of the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.71 The principal extension of the tax
base beyond the base derived by focusing upon incremental value is in
the area of windfalls receipts that are not attributable to the efforts of the
recipients.
It is not clear, however, how far the result in Glenshaw Glass actually
extends beyond the reach of an incremental value approach to the in-
come tax. Some windfalls, like finding a pearl in an oyster, are simply
"found" value, included in the tax base as if the taxpayer had created the
entire value. Other values included under the Glenshaw Glass rubric, but
not incremental value attributable to the recipient, are likely to have
been deducted from the tax base of the creator to which they are attribu-
table. That creator has treated the value either as lost or as a factor in the
creation of new value, in a process in which the taxpayer receiving the
windfall played only a minor role. Those values that remain in the tax
base, like the treble damages in Glenshaw Glass itself, remain because of
overriding policy concerns regarding the implementation of the regula-
tory schemes which compel the transfers in question.
Under this view, an exclusion for transfer payments simply reflects that
the recipient is neither the creator of value, nor someone entitled to share
with the creator because of a financial investment in the value's creation.
The receipt, like the more frequently encountered gift excluded under
§ 102, is not the appropriate moment for taxation, since there has been no
new value created in which the government is entitled to a share. That
moment, under the view of the income tax presented here, was on the
creation of the value by the transferor or some predecessor of the
transferor.
Whether the value was in fact captured upon its creation at the hands
of some predecessor transferor may be difficult to determine, and may
70. The inclusion of any appreciation attributable to the time before the transfer in the
donee's tax base, is merely an accident of the realization rules. See Taft v. Bowers, 278
U.S. 470, 482, 484 (1929).
71. 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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not therefore be suitable as a criterion for determining whether an
amount ought to be excluded. For instance, the federal income taxes of
individual taxpayers have not been deducted from their tax bases; pay-
ments from such receipts would properly be considered as payments of
already-taxed values. State income taxes may have been deducted, but
most state sales taxes will not. Under such circumstances, it seems silly to
attempt to develop a coherent set of rules for excluding transfer pay-
ments based on whether the amount actually represents an already-taxed
value. Nevertheless, the fact that a substantial amount of such transfers
have in fact already been subject to tax suggests that, in terms of this
criterion for defining the income tax base, it is impossible to determine
whether the greater error might occur in the inclusion or the exclusion of
such amounts. Indeed, at the limit, an inclusion in the income tax base by
the amount of transfer payments made would overstate the sum of newly
created values by more than the tax rate to which the payments were
subject.72
The proffered justifications for exclusions of transfer payments have
not, however, generally relied upon this view of the income tax. To the
extent such justifications have been offered, they have relied upon a
sense that in a progressive income tax, exclusions for amounts that are
received based upon the need status of the recipient are appropriate as
both normative and practical matters, since inclusion is not likely to result
in taxable income. Additionally, it may appear unseemly for the federal
government to claim a share of all transfer payments, especially when
such a claim would simply mean that the budget for the program would
have to be grossed up to account for the tax in order for the goals of the
transfer payment system to be met.
This approach to the general welfare doctrine itself would go a long
way in sorting out the ways in which ancillary doctrines should be in-
voked to avoid inappropriate "double benefits." If the transfer payment
truly is a transfer payment, a payment in a context in which the recipient
could be seen neither as participating in the creation of any new value nor
as being reimbursed for a recent loss of after-tax value, the presumption
should be that the recipient will be able to account for her use of the
value without regard for its source. This approach would allow both re-
cipients of government payments excluded under the general welfare
doctrine and recipients of unrestricted private charity the same after-tax
benefit from their receipts. If, on the other hand, the exclusion is pro-
vided merely to prevent a grossing-up problem in ascertaining the appro-
priate amount of the receipt, then the resulting expenditures should not
produce a tax benefit.
Should these conclusions be articulated in a statute or left within the
province of the IRS? The answer to this question lies in part in one's
72. Each dollar of transfer payment would create fifteen cents of tax receipts, which
would in theory enable another fifteen cents of transfer payments, which would result in
another seventy-five cents of tax, and so forth.
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faith in the competence of Congress.73 A plausible solution might be to
clarify that the IRS has the authority to grant nonstatutory exc!usions
along the lines of the general welfare doctrine and the authority to an-
nounce ancillary rules for implementing those exclusions. But if basis will
be denied for the use of the receipt under the ancillary rule, such a posi-
tion can only be enforced prospectively.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
Perhaps it would be better to consolidate all transfer payments pro-
grams and coordinate their treatment coherently within the federal tax
system. That does not, however, seem likely in the near future. State and
local government units are likely to continue to design and administer
their own programs. Federal programs are likely to continue to be de-
signed in relatively haphazard ways, depending upon the coincidence of
73. One can easily doubt the competence of Congress to draft effective and consistent
provisions limiting double deductions if one examines the inconsistencies in some of the
provisions designed at limiting double benefits.
Denying other benefit where credit provided:
1. Adoption credit: two separate denials, one for items that are deductible,
and one "to the extent that funds for such expense are received under any
Federal, State, or local program." I.R.C. § 23(b)(3)(A), (B) (West 2006).
2. Denying leaving credit for any amount for which a deduction is allowed.
Id. § 25A(g)(5).
3. Employer credit for employer payment of social security with respect to
tips. Id. § 45B(c). "No deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for any
amount taken into account in determining the credit under this section." Id.
4. Denial of deduction or basis for amount taken as credit for disabled access
expenditures (credit is for fifty percent of expenditure). Id. § 44(d)(7).
5. Credit for investment in employer-provided childcare facilities (percent-
age of expenditures, with cap), with basis reduced by amount of credit. Id.
§ 45F(f).
6. Alternative motor vehicle credit denying other deduction or credit, to the
extent credit is taken. Id. § 30B(h)(5) (seemingly reducing deductions by
amount of credit, which incompletely and irrationally affects overall
benefits).
Denying some but not all double benefit:
1. Section 29(g)(2)(C) contains a "denial of double benefit" that prevents
claiming credit for a facility producing nonconventional fuels, if a credit for
the same facility was claimed in a prior year, apparently not limiting the
credit (which is not computed by reference to any actual expenditure) by any
benefit from cost recovery or deduction. Id. § 29(g)(2)(c).
2. Denying inclusion of single cost in two separate measures of research
credit, but leaving cost unaffected by claim of credit. Id. § 41(f)(6)(D).
No "double benefit for exclusions":
1. Energy conservation subsidies provided to customers by public utilities...
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, no deduction or credit
shall be allowed for, or by reason of, any expenditure to the extent of the
amount excluded under subsection (a) for any subsidy which was provided
with respect to such expenditure. The adjusted basis of any property shall
be reduced by the amount excluded under subsection (a) which was pro-
vided with respect to such property. Id. § 136(b).
No deduction for exclusion:
1. No regulations prescribed under this section shall permit the utilization of
any deduction (or other tax benefit) if such amount was in effect reimbursed
by nontaxable Federal financial assistance. Id. § 597(b)(3).
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beneficiaries' needs and the coalitions that can be formed to meet those
needs. Given this reality, there seems to be a clear need to rationalize
not only the grounds for granting exclusions for transfer payments and
the consequences thereof, but also the appropriate role of the IRS and
Congress in the rationalization process.
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